wisdom about the value of low-fat diets, the refusal of researchers to pursue RCTs of vitamin C as a treatment for cancer, and the ability of politically empowered research populations to shape the conduct of RCTs for treatments of AIDS. RCTs are not an uncomplicated, objective technique but a social and political process,"the product of a negotiated social order." They "cannot be pried apart from the vested interests and social objectives which they embody." RCTs have such "interpretative flexibility" that, "rather than settling controversies, [they] may instead reflect and propel them." In sum, they are part of broader processes of the "social management of trust."5
The debates over CABG provide an opportunity to extend this analysis of RCTs to the field of surgery, where their role has been fiercely contested. RCTs of CABG have already attracted some analysis, as examples of the process of therapeutic evaluation, of the success of this process, and of obstacles to this process. For instance, Jochen Schaefer has argued that by the time surgeons had perfected CABG enough to allow a meaningful RCT, the "cardiological and cardiosurgical industry" was too committed to the procedure to perform such an "exact and critical analysis of its own work." These analyses leave crucial questions unanswered. An examination of the debates that followed the early RCTs of CABG shows that concerns with the technical details of the trials were far less important than the preconceptions held by protagonists.6 The presence of a substantial debate before the RCTs were published allows an analysis of the origins of these preconceptions. This essay will explain these preconceptions and trace their impact on the ensuing debates. It will show how disciplinary tensions, disciplinary histories, and traditions of physiological and clinical research all shaped the evaluation of cardiac therapeutics. It will demonstrate how visual validation of CABG provided an alternative to the statistical ideal of RCTs.
NOTORIOUS TREATMENTS OF CORONARY ARTERY DISEASE
To understand the ferocity of the debates that surrounded coronary artery bypass surgery, it is necessary to appreciate the magnitude of the problem surgeons sought to treat. During the 1970s coronary artery disease (also known as ischemic heart disease) affected millions of people in the United States. By various estimates, it killed over 600,000 people each year, incapacitating another 3.5 to 5.0 million people. Leading cardiologists, such as Harvard Medical School's Eugene Braunwald, considered coronary artery disease "to be the greatest scourge of Western man." Its burden of suffering, disability, and deaths "dwarfs all of the other critical problems that face us in this turbulent era." Donald Effler, the chief of cardiac surgery at the Cleveland Clinic, emphasized how coronary artery disease struck down "the most active and responsible" members of society: it was "so common among professional people, executives and men in public office" that it could "cripple the nation." It was "so prevalent and ominous that heroic measures to deal with it seem not only appropriate but essential."7 Unfortunately, through the 1960s doctors had found no satisfactory treatments. The work of James Herrick in the early twentieth century had provided a simple model for coronary artery disease.8 The coronary arteries supply blood flow to the muscles of the heart (see Figure 1 ). If flow through these vessels is obstructed, by atherosclerosis or spasm, the demand of the muscle for oxygenated blood exceeds the supply. This imbalance initially produces angina pectoris, "the wailing of an anguished heart during that period of stress when it is getting inadequate perfusion." If the imbalance is severe enough the muscle cells start to die, producing a myocardial infarction, or heart attack.9
With this understanding of coronary artery disease, physicians recognized two treatment strategies: increase the supply of blood or reduce the demand for it. Many creative techniques had been tried along both lines.10 Early efforts to reduce demand, such as operations in the 1930s to remove the thyroid gland to slow the heart's rhythm, were abandoned because of unacceptable complications. Efforts to increase supply showed more promise. Sympathectomy, first performed in 1916, cut the sympathetic nerves to dilate coronary arteries. While it did not actually improve blood flow, it inadvertently eased the symptoms of angina by interrupting sensory transmission from the heart. In the 1930s the Cleveland Clinic surgeon Claude Beck developed many techniques to provide alternative blood supplies for the heart. He connected a variety of noncardiac tissues-including pericardium, fat, muscle, skin, lung, omentum, stomach, intestines, liver, and spleen-to the heart, hoping that blood would flow from the donor tissue to the cardiac muscle. Other researchers attempted direct manipulation of blood vessels. In 1939 Italian surgeons claimed to increase coronary blood flow by ligating (tying off) the internal mammary artery, a vessel that carries blood to the rib cage. In 1946 the Quebec surgeon Arthur Vineberg began to implant the cut end of arteries-the subclavian, intercostal, carotid, or splenic-directly into the wall of the heart. Meanwhile, Beck connected the coronary veins to the aorta, reversing their flow of blood, turning veins into arteries to bring new blood to heart. Across this range of techniques, surgeons typically reported success-relief of pain and ability to return to work-in 80 to 90 percent of patients. Evaluation of these new techniques was complicated by the elusive nature of angina pectoris. Observers had long recognized that "symptoms of cardiac ischemia may come and go in a random fashion, seemingly unrelated to therapeutic interventions." As a result, skeptics argued that relief of angina did not equal therapeutic success: "the notorious unreliability of such data should preclude any important inferences." Even surgeons agreed: "Relief of angina pectoris by an operative procedure is not a certain index of surgical success." Long experience had also taught physicians that angina was remarkably susceptible to placebo effects. In a classic study, Henry Beecher showed that angina and many other symptoms-responded to irrelevant treatments, consistently improving in 35.2 percent of patients.11
Placebo effects of surgery had been strikingly demonstrated in the case of internal mammary artery ligation. Many observers, noting that the internal mammary artery had no connections to the heart, could not believe surgeons' claims of success. Two groups conducted controlled studies in which thirty-five unwitting patients were assigned to receive either ligation or a sham operation. Remarkably, patients in both groups reported increased exercise tolerance and reduced need for pain-relieving medication. Struggling to explain this dramatic demonstration of the power of surgical placebos, the researchers credited the many aspects of cardiac surgery that contributed to the perceived effects: "The frightened, poorly informed man with angina, winding himself tighter and tighter, sensitizing himself to every twinge of chest discomfort, who then comes into the environment of a great medical center and a powerful positive personality and sees and hears the results to be anticipated from the suggested therapy is not the same total patient who leaves the institution with the trademark scar." 12 By the late 1960s these experiences had left physicians frustrated. New drugs showed promise for reducing cardiac oxygen consumption, but the cardiologists Edward Orgain and Henry McIntosh feared that these would fail because of complications that included heart failure, shock, and death. Cardiologists frequently confessed their impotence. For instance, in 1972 David Spodick, from Tufts University School of Medicine, concluded that medical management "had failed." Surgeons were quick to criticize, with Donald Effler characterizing cardiologists' efforts as "not terribly impressive, either to the patient or to the cardiac surgeon." But surgeons themselves had little to celebrate. Effier admitted that by the early 1960s coronary artery surgery had fallen into "virtual disrepute": "papers on this subject were viewed with frank skepticism and the authors looked upon with suspicion." The cardiologist Mason Sones saw promise in Effier's work but nonetheless chastised his surgical colleagues: "Gentleman, I suggest you surgeons get with it!""3 of the disease process. 14 This suggested new surgical techniques: instead of creating new conduits to bring blood to the heart, surgeons needed only to find a way to fix the focal obstructions of the coronary arteries. Effler and his team first tried endarterectomy, removing the obstructing plaque from the coronary artery. They abandoned this technique when they realized that fragments broke off the plaque and produced new obstructions further along the arterial tree. In 1962 Effler attempted a new operation: he left the plaque in place but used a patch of pericardium to expand the diameter of the coronary artery. This procedure, named the "Vista Dome" for its resemblance to the passenger cars of railroads, allowed blood to flow past the obstruction (see Figure 3) . The operation, a "direct, surgical attack," provided "instant revascularization." Combining this direct approach with Vineberg's internal mammary artery implants allowed Effler's team to treat patients who had both focal and diffuse obstructions. Earlier beliefs that only a limited set of patients could benefit from surgery were "restrictive and unimaginative"; surgery could be "applicable to a rather wide group of coronary artery problems."'5 The future seemed full of promise. In this setting Rene' Favaloro began his work at the Cleveland Clinic (see Figure 4) . Favaloro had been a general surgeon in rural Argentina when, in 1962, he committed himself to becoming a heart surgeon and flew to Cleveland with only a letter of introduction. He arrived soon after Effler's first successful patch-graft repair and Sones's demonstration of blood flow through Vineberg implants. Although he shared in the excitement of Effler' s early successes, Favaloro was not satisfied with the existing techniques. Impressed by the work of vascular surgeons, who used vein grafts to bypass obstructions in renal arteries, he adapted the bypass technique for the heart (see Figure 5) cardiologist Richard Ross believed that CABG might become "the most significant advance in the therapy of heart disease in our time." Use of CABG spread to many medical centers and community hospitals. The range of its applications quickly expanded; by 1968 it had been used to treat patients during acute heart attacks. CABG received such favorable media publicity that many patients came to hospitals seeking the surgery. By 1974, 100,000 CABGs had been performed. Surgeons and cardiologists believed that the procedure relieved pain, prevented heart attacks, and prolonged lives. Effler was triumphant: "There seems to be little doubt today that the surgeon will continue to play a dominant role in the treatment of the patient who suffers from ischemic heart disease."19 His forecast was accurate: by 1980 roughly 150,000 procedures were performed each year (see Figure 7) . With a typical cost of $15,000 to $20,000 for each operation, the annual cost of CABG exceeded $2 billion, roughly 1 percent of the total national health expenditure.20 factors led observers to conclude that "financial incentives for performing the operation are enormous, and there is no balancing economic disincentive to restrain the operation."23 These critics and skeptics were always quick to state that they did not oppose CABG everyone hoped that it would work. Cardiologists had long struggled to provide relief to patients suffering from angina, and CABG brought the prospect that a cure might finally be at hand. Tufts cardiologist David Spodick, a leading skeptic, believed that CABG was ''a quantum jump ahead of its predecessors in concept and execution"; he agreed "with Favaloro that bypass surgery holds the greatest promise for definitive management." Braunwald held a similar position. The concern was not so much substantive as epistemological. Spodick stated this most clearly: "My criticism of the surgical enthusiasts is not that they are wrong (or even probably wrong), but rather that they have not attempted to really prove themselves right"; "the professional quality and technical skill of the disputants is not in question. medically treated patients from the Cleveland Clinic in the 1960s, patients treated before the advent of cardiac care units and many valuable drugs, "at a chronologically different and therapeutically not comparable time." Without data from RCTs, the CABG debates were "a battle of wits between unarmed opponents."27 Moreover, the retrospective case series generally relied on unconvincing assessments of therapeutic efficacy. Surgeons celebrated the extent to which CABG could relieve angina. As noted earlier, however, angina was well known to be susceptible to placebo effects. Furthermore, even if CABG did relieve angina, it might have done so by damaging the coronary nerves or by inducing an intraoperative heart attack rather than by improving the underlying coronary artery disease. Some surgeons celebrated their patients' ability to return to work. But since many patients had avoided work because of doctor-induced fear that work would cause angina, they could be "cured" by suggestion: "A patient who is not working because of iatrogenic prophylaxis and who later returns to work because of surgical charisma may be falsely designated as improved due to a bypass graft whose main effect was to evoke enthusiastic iatrotherapy." Finally, demonstration of graft patency with angiography was also inconclusive: patency did not prove that significant blood flowed under ordinary conditions.28
Instead, critics wanted definitive answers about the impact of CABG on mortality. Braunwald stated this firmly in 1971: "Many questions must be answered. First and foremost: How do the survival rates and symptoms compare in operated and nonoperated patients?" Ross, Spodick, and Schatz all agreed. Since medical treatments could provide three-year survival in 80 to 90 percent of patients, surgical treatments had only a small window in which to show improvement. This had to be balanced against the risk of the operation. These skeptics all believed that only an RCT had the necessary statistical rigor to manage these statistical subtleties. Admittedly, it would not be an ideal trial: since a sham operation for the medical control group was not considered ethical, the trial could not be blinded. However, by randomly assigning patients to medical or surgical treatment groups, the trial would minimize bias, provide a meaningful control group, and determine whether CABG could improve survival, "the most unequivocal and definitive" of all out- RCTs was "unrealistic and naive. It fails completely to take into account some important differences between drugs and operations." After all, every patient presented a unique challenge, every surgeon had different skills, and each operation could utilize a bewildering range of procedures. Since sham operations were not considered ethical, the study could not be blinded: patients and physicians would know which treatment each patient received, reintroducing a bias RCTs were designed to eliminate. And, as many surgeons noted, since the studies required many years of follow-up, they faced the problem of evolving techniques: "Just when we have accumulated enough data over a sufficient time period, we find that surgical technique has improved or medical therapy changes, or both, and conclusions no longer apply." Surgeons used these excuses to avoid RCTs. Since the results of RCTs would not be "completely objective," David Sabiston argued in 1971, the studies should not be done. In 1979 Hywel Davies described how he had feared that the V.A. study would be "an expensive and time-consuming effort without valid conclusions"; as a result, the V.A. hospital at which he was chief of surgery did not participate.39
As soon as the main report of the V.A. study was published, CABG enthusiasts responded with a firestorm of critique. The New England Journal of Medicine received so many letters that it published a special correspondence section in a subsequent issue. Cardiac surgeons highlighted weaknesses in the design and conduct of the study (complaining that it was "marred by very serious flaws"), suggested that the study's surgeons had performed CABG poorly, and provided their own superior Indifference to race and gender does not explain the selection of patients for CABG, however. When gender was specified, the patients were overwhelmingly male. When race was specified, the patients were overwhelmingly white. White men were over-represented among patients chosen for CABG given the distribution of heart disease in the population. analysis in cardiac trials; the role of bias in referral for cardiac procedures remains contested. 45 The V.A. trial was not the last word on the problem of CABG. RCTs, case series, and consensus reports continued to appear for decades. But the debate over the V.A. study was the defining moment in the history of RCTs for CABG. Many physicians wished the whole affair had never happened. Cardiologists at Emory feared that the controversy over the RCTs had "blunted the enthusiasm for such an approach." As Braunwald wrote in 1981, everyone would have been better off without the "major controversy, even acrimony. The conflicts among cardiologists and cardiovascular surgeons spilled into the lay press, confusing patients and physicians alike."46 What had produced such a contentious and intractable debate?
WAS IT ALL IN THE DETAILS?
As Harry Marks, Steven Epstein, and Evelleen Richards have shown, RCTs are never simple to conduct. Problems with patient selection, adherence to assigned treatments, and interpretation of results all fuel fierce debate. There is much evidence that this happened with RCTs of CABG. Critics immediately attacked perceived weaknesses of the V.A. study: selection of a low-risk group of patients (resulting in remarkably high survival in the medical group), poor surgical results (high operative mortality, low graft patency), and poor compliance with the treatment specified (many patients initially assigned to the medical group subsequently had surgery). 47 Consider operative mortality. Supporters of the study defended its 5.6 percent operative mortality rate as consistent with rates for most surgery performed between 1972 and 1974. But opponents argued that the results were unacceptably poor. Both groups were right, depending on what standards (elite, national average, community hospital) were seen as most relevant. As the controversy continued, some contestants resorted to rhetorical chicanery. Critics from the Cleveland Clinic and the Texas Heart Institute argued that the V.A. data-399 patients operated on in thirteen hospitals over three years-proved that the participating surgeons had inadequate experience with CABG, performing less than one operation per hospital per month. The V.A. group was quick to defend their experience: during the study period they operated on over 1,300 patients who were not enrolled in the study.48
But were such methodological criticisms really at the core of critics' evaluation of the V.A. study? Their own actions indicate that this cannot be the case. First, Favaloro and many other CABG enthusiasts, though they attacked the main V.A. study, accepted the data subset showing the benefit of CABG in treating left main coronary artery obstruction. The V.A. group was quick to mock the illogic of such a position: "this subset was part of the Cooperative Study and was treated by the same surgeons, in the same institutions, under the same conditions, and in the same time frame as the remaining 88% of the patients in the study." Second, enthusiasts continued to publish and rely on their own case series, which they admitted were even more methodologically flawed than the V.A. study.49
Alvan Feinstein, professor of medicine and epidemiology at Yale, had a valuable insight. He had observed the competing claims about the quality of the V.A. study and concluded that both sides were right: V.A. surgery was worse than that at the Cleveland Clinic but comparable to surgery in most institutions and better than that in some. The V.A. study was flawed, but so were retrospective case series. Reasonable arguments could support either position; reasonable criticisms could undermine them. For Feinstein, this was the "essence of tragedy": "the destructive collision of two protagonists holding opposing positions, each of which is right."50 Such a conclusion suggests that responses to the trial were underdetermined by the available information. In fact, the responses depended on contestants' prior commitments-a fact that with tremendous confidence in themselves, as manifested in the olympianism described by Spodick. Cardiac surgeons had learned that direct repair of damaged hearts cured patients. Why should CABG be different? As noted earlier, cardiologists had been feeling substantially less triumphant in 1968, especially about coronary artery disease. This might have made them particularly sensitive to surgeons' enthusiastic claims about the powers of CABG. But while cardiologists might have been overshadowed in the media, they did make dramatic progress in many areas during the first decade of CABG. New understanding of risk factors, such as diet, lack of exercise, and smoking, enabled them to suggest better preventive care for their patients. New drugs enabled them to treat anemia, hypertension, and other conditions that exacerbated coronary artery disease. New technologies, including echocardiography and radionucleotide imaging, improved diagnostic accuracy. Better methods of resuscitation and intensive care enabled them to save the lives of patients whose coronary artery disease culminated in a heart attack. While cardiologists might have lacked the boundless confidence of their surgical colleagues, they had faith that continued work would eventually lead to definitive medical treatments of coronary artery disease. By 1978 Braunwald could declare that the "golden age" was at hand.58 With success seemingly within their reach, cardiologists found the heroics of surgery unnecessary. such simple methods were sufficient to confirm the efficacy of CABG, just as they had proven the value of penicillin and appendectomies.59
Critics had a simple response. Howard Hiatt, an oncologist at the Harvard School of Public Health, agreed that therapeutic efficacy could be self-evident in some cases, when the disease was "uniformly fatal in outcome and often devastating in manifestations." This had been the case with appendicitis and aortic aneurysms. But coronary artery disease was not such a case: CABG "does not lead to speedy and uniform improvement," and the symptoms of coronary artery disease "are subject to inexplicable remissions and exacerbations."60 Even when surgeons operated following the acute drama of a heart attack, they focused on preventing a second heart attack, a probabilistic phenomenon that could be demonstrated only with well-controlled trials. Surgeons thus faced a chronic condition that did not allow dramatic, definitive demonstrations of therapeutic efficacy. Furthermore, by moving into an area traditionally managed medically, they had to confront medical standards of knowledge-the RCT. In this model, the ensuing controversy reflected the growing pains of a new standard of knowledge introduced into surgery.
However, as already noted, the antagonists in the controversy over CABG did not split cleanly along disciplinary lines. To begin with, the status of RCTs within cardiology was complicated: RCTs did not have a monopoly on knowledge production. Instead, different standards of knowledge coexisted. Some, like Spodick, who had trained with RCT guru Thomas Chalmers, remained thoroughly committed to trials as the surest route to knowledge. Others, like Braunwald, experienced in the instrumental traditions of cardiac physiology, moved freely between advocacy of RCTs for CABG and the use of less rigorous protocols for other research questions.61
There were many reasons for cardiologists' continuing affinity for the traditional methods of cardiac physiology. Spodick claims that cardiologists were the last of the medical subspecialists to join the RCT bandwagon because of their unique ability to measure and modify the heart's function and dysfunction: "we can make the heart perform tricks, with everything from simple bedside maneuvers to sophisticated pharmacologic and physiologic interventions. It reacts promptly, with responses we can measure in milliseconds, and even our treatments often produce rapid and quantifiable responses."62 This ability to make the heart perform tricks had long shaped the traditions of cardiac research. Into the late 1960s cardiologists, like cardiac surgeons, maintained active research programs in cardiac physiology. Braunwald's 1966 review of progress in cardiology reveals a veritable menagerie of animal models and organ preparations: cows, rabbits, dogs, cats, frogs, and humans; normal hearts, isolated hearts, trypsin-digested embryonic hearts, Skeptics saw CABG as just the most recent entrant in this series. As Spodick notedand Ross and Takaro agreed-"Well founded optimism for the effectiveness of coronary bypass surgery cannot be divorced from the knowledge that previous attempts at revascularization were proclaimed and hotly pursued with equal optimism." Charles Bailey, who had experienced his own cycle of enthusiasm and disillusionment after developing endarterectomy in 1957, felt obliged "to pour cold water" on the enthusiasm for CABG generated by a Cleveland Clinic presentation at the 1970 meeting of the Society for Thoracic Surgery. He reminded the audience that in 1967 Effler had described patch-graft repairs "as the next best thing to sexual intercourse. Today he will tell you it wasn't so good."77 Skeptics saw little reason to expect the fate of CABG to be different.
How did CABG enthusiasts respond? They did not deny the notorious history of coronary revascularization. After the failures of sympathectomy, omentopexy, and Vineberg implants, Effler could understand the "widespread disillusionment" of cardiologists, who saw persistent surgeons "as dubious characters, if not true charlatans." He regretted that these early efforts had ever been made, "as the rewards were meager and the heritage of medical resentment and suspicion remains today." Instead of denying the lessons of history, Effler and his colleagues denied their relevance: the clear moral of past failures did not apply to CABG. Why? Not because of surgical superiority, but because of the new diagnostic power of angiography. Effler argued that all previous operations had violated "the basic principle of therapy": "treatment was undertaken before adequate diagnosis." Traditional diagnostic methods-looking at symptoms, age, weight, occupation, ethnicity, and EKG-had yielded notoriously unreliable diagnoses. Healthy patients were given diagnoses of serious disease, while others suffered heart attacks "shortly after they have been given a clean bill of health." Because of inaccurate diagnosis, surgeons had in the past operated on many patients who did not actually have coronary artery disease: "it is little wonder that the early era of coronary artery surgery was destined to end in disrepute."78 For Effler and his colleagues, this historical pattern was shattered by the advent of selective coronary angiography. As the technique spread rapidly in the 1960s, physicians at least those who had faith in angiography-could for the first time directly visualize the coronary arteries of their patients. Sones's "monumental work" transformed the world for surgeons at the Cleveland Clinic. It provided "visual diagnosis," a "leap forward in our ability to read coronary disease that can be fairly likened to the impact of the invention of the printing press on the written word." It gave surgeons "a literal 'road map' of the heart's The debates over CABG showed that faith in angiography, or lack thereof, shaped not only protagonists' evaluations of physiological and clinical data but also their evaluations of the legacy of the history of cardiac therapeutics. In subsequent controversies over treatments of coronary artery disease, visualization remained crucial as cardiologists and cardiac surgeons struggled to apply the lessons of CABG.
By the end of the 1970s, the controversy over CABG began to diminish. Continuing study and consensus panels essentially confirmed the findings of the V.A. study.82 Spodick and Braunwald conceded that while survival was similar in most patients treated medically or surgically, surgery produced longer survival in some groups and better quality of life in most. Consensus panels from the American Medical Association and the National Institutes of Health agreed. For many physicians, the fact that trials had been conducted was as important as the findings themselves. As Spodick was pleased to note in 1977, "wholesale application of the procedure finally is being channeled by appropriate studies of what it accomplishes and for whom."83 However, while the RCTs of CABG eventually came to be seen as a success, it had taken ten years for adequate evaluation of CABG to emerge. The experience of the RCTs of CABG became a story that no one wanted to repeat. Time, effort, money, and even patients' lives had been wasted while the controversy lingered. Participants in the CABG debates committed themselves to doing a better job the next time around. As early as 1973, Spodick argued that although "prejudice has now made it too late to do properly designed, controlled trials of bypass operations, we should at least be mindful of the need in the next procedure to come along." In 1978 Braunwald expressed the hope that after the experiences with CABG physicians would insist on "careful, objective assessment, by prospective randomized trials when necessary." These needed to be done as early as possible, "before the genie escapes from the bottle."84 These dreams did not come true. Since the 1970s, new treatments for coronary artery disease have continued to appear and spread without trials, generating the same post hoc calls for trials. CABG was applied to the treatment of acute heart attacks as early as April 1968. Favaloro, Effler, and fellow enthusiasts quickly accepted its value: postoperative angiography showed that "the vast majority of heart muscle can be saved." Although they lacked long-term follow-up data, they believed that the operation prevented impending heart attacks and preserved heart muscle in patients experiencing heart attacks. Chalmers, McIntosh, and others demanded long-term data and called for trials: "Can we learn from our mistakes of the past?" 85 When cardiologists developed drugs, such as streptokinase and other fibrinolytic agents, that could dissolve the blood clots implicated in heart attacks, Braunwald immediately called for trials "to prevent a decade or more of confusion about the powers of this latest genie." Angiography did indeed show that streptokinase could restore blood flow through an acutely occluded vessel. But did streptokinase really prevent the progression of a heart attack? Braunwald warned that the old ideal of restoring blood flow might actually create a risk: experience from animals and patients had shown that reperfusion of myocardium during an infarction could lead to serious hemorrhage. Controversy lingered for years. 86 The desired lesson of CABG-that all subsequent treatments should be evaluated with RCTs immediately-had been inverted. CABG had demonstrated that certain kinds of techniques, particularly those supported by physiological common sense and visual dem-onstration, could be incorporated into medical practice without trials. The history of angioplasty provides the most striking example. In 1977 cardiologists introduced percutaneous transluminal coronary angioplasty (PTCA) as a less invasive alternative to CABG for relieving obstructed coronary arteries. In this procedure a balloon-tipped catheter is threaded into the coronary arteries and inflated within the narrowed atherosclerotic region. By cracking the plaque and stretching the vessel walls, PTCA increases the functional lumen of the vessel, allowing new pathways for blood flow. 87 PTCA shared the aesthetic and mechanistic appeals of CABG. It modified the plaques perceived to be the cause of coronary artery disease. Its effects were direct and immediate, visualizable with angiography and real-time fluoroscopy. Furthermore, PTCA required a shorter hospital stay than CABG and was much cheaper to perform. As a result, PTCA experienced an even more spectacular spread in the 1980s than CABG had in the 1970s. The first PTCA was performed in 1977; 2,000 were performed in 1979 (compared to 144,000 CABGs). More than 80,000 PTCAs were performed annually in the mid 1980s (compared to roughly 205,000 CABGs). By the late 1980s, the number of PTCAs done by cardiologists surpassed the number of CABGs done by cardiac surgeons (see Figure  7) . This growth continued into the 1990s, with more than 300,000 PTCAs performed each year. 88 As with CABG, the early spread of PTCA occurred in the absence of rigorous statistical data about its efficacy. Calls for trials came early. Spodick again led the way. In 1979 he expressed his frustration that the Food and Drug Administration did not hold new procedures to the same standards as drugs. He called on cardiologists not to repeat the mistakes surgeons had made with the Vineberg procedure and CABG: "we must not prematurely let this new genie out of its bottle." Although PTCA seemed promising, cardiologists had not demonstrated that it provided long-term benefits. Since medical therapy already offered excellent survival rates for most patients, the main question was whether PTCA gave better relief of symptoms. Spodick hoped that hospital committees and journal editors would be "professional guardians of scientific integrity" and demand RCTs.89 But no trials appeared.
Consensus was quickly reached that PTCA worked best for single vessel disease and CABG for left main disease. However, indications for patients with intermediate disease-"the vast majority of patients requiring revascularization" -remained ambiguous. But still no trials appeared. Calls for trials continued throughout the 1980s and early 1990s, citing RCTs as the most reliable way of comparing the symptomatic relief, the survival benefit, and the cost of PTCA and CABG. Trials comparing PTCA to CABG did not begin to be published until 1992. 90 Cardiologists, who had aggressively criticized the epistemological standards of cardiac surgeons in the 1970s, thus accepted and performed coronary angioplasty for fifteen years without data from RCTs.
Like CABG enthusiasts before them, PTCA enthusiasts offered many reasons why RCTs were too difficult to conduct and too limited in their results. They cited many methodological complications: inadequate criteria for characterizing each patient's degree of atherosclerosis; variations in how the procedure is performed and in how success and complications are evaluated; statistical problems in analyzing small patient populations and rare adverse outcomes. They also complained that the trials were both too time consuming and too expensive to conduct. As Andreas Gruintzig, the developer of PTCA, stated: "the call for randomization is easily made but difficult to follow."91 Meanwhile, supporters found solace in the compelling evidence provided by angiography: as they deflated the balloon and removed the catheter, they could see blood flowing where none, or not enough, had flowed before.
Eventually, some RCTs of PTCA were completed. The parallels with CABG are striking. The results of two long-awaited trials were published, with an accompanying editorial, in the New England Journal of Medicine in 1994. Both trials found that, in most cases, PTCA and CABG produced equivalent long-term outcomes. In the absence of definitive answers about therapeutic efficacy, the choice was left to individual patients and doctors. 92 The pattern did not end with angioplasty. Starting in 1995, new techniques of minimally invasive CABG became increasingly popular in the United States. Instead of requiring a 30-cm incision through the patient's sternum, these procedures used an 8-cm "keyhole" incision and a series of small ports, like those used in laparoscopic abdominal surgery, to gain access to the heart. In some versions cardiopulmonary bypass was not used: the surgeon operated on a slowed but beating heart. Early results-from case series-showed that minimally invasive CABG caused less pain, required shorter hospital stays, and cost less than traditional CABG. Formal evaluation of its efficacy, however, did not appear. 93 Surgeons assumed that if the immediate revascularization was comparable to that with traditional CABG, then the long-term results should be as good. But even this had not been well studied: intra-or postoperative angiography was not consistently performed.94 How did the technique prosper despite such lack of validation? Like traditional CABG, minimally invasive CABG provided a direct, mechanical fix for the perceived cause of coronary artery disease. When the clamps are released, the surgeon can see the blood flow. This sight was so convincing that angiography seemed unnecessary.
As cardiac surgeons continued to refine their techniques, cardiologists introduced a fundamentally new approach: gene therapy. In November 1998 Jeffrey Isner-who was first exposed to cardiology as a medical student working with Mason Sones in 1967 reported the successful use of vascular endothelial growth factor to induce the formation of new blood vessels in ischemic myocardium. Within thirty days the gene therapy had relieved angina in all five patients, each of whom had had crippling, intractable angina despite multiple previous revascularization procedures. All had evidence of improved perfusion, as visualized with single photon emission computed tomography. Isner acknowledged the ideal of an RCT and hoped that one would be done soon. But since his technique required an operation for administering the genes, a proper RCT would require a sham operation for the control group, which he, the National Institutes of Health, and the Food and Drug Administration were unwilling to allow.95 It seems likely that Isner's treatment will be held to the high standard of an RCT once less invasive methods of gene administration are developed, both because of widespread cultural anxieties over gene therapy and because gene therapy lacks the direct, immediately visualizable appeal of both CABG and PTCA.
Meanwhile, the evaluation of these new techniques is no longer simply a matter of physicians debating their efficacy. Instead, in the financially constrained contexts of managed care, physicians must not only convince themselves, but also their insurers, not only of efficacy, but also of cost efficiency. To complicate matters further, these new technologies have become major growth areas for commercial enterprise. Physicians have formed alliances with private companies. Millions of dollars have poured in from venture capital firms. This raises serious concerns about financial conflicts of interest as physicians claim to generate objective knowledge of therapeutic efficacy.96
As historians such as Harry Marks, Steven Epstein, and Norman Richards have shown, the ability of RCTs to resolve questions of therapeutic efficacy will always be contested. The specific case of CABG demonstrates not only the decisive role played by precon-ceived opinions but also the origins of such preconceptions. Personal experiences-from Spodick's training under Chalmers to Takaro's disillusionment with angiography-played a role. Interdisciplinary hostility, though present, was overshadowed by intradisciplinary differences in standards of knowledge, specifically the relevance of physiological and clinical measures of coronary artery disease. Assessments of the persuasiveness of visual evidence were crucial. Did angiographic demonstration of restoration of blood flow represent a successful treatment? Did angiographic diagnosis and postoperative assessment make CABG different from all the treatments that had come before? Individuals' answers to these questions guided their evaluation of CABG and its RCTs.
Fundamentally, these cases demonstrate the consequences of the coexistence of multiple representations of a single disease. Each representation, whether physiological or clinical, visual or statistical, allows different modes of assessing therapeutic efficacy. In the case of cardiac therapeutics, the traditions of visual demonstration will always stand as an alternative to the statistical ideals of RCTs. But as Galison and others have shown, such disunity in science need not be feared.97 The cost of pluralism might be therapeutic confusion at best and the infliction of untested treatments on patients at worst. Nonetheless, it continues to spark imaginative efforts against the "greatest scourge of Western man." 97 Galison concludes: "Science is disunified, and-against our first intuitions-it is precisely the disunification of science that brings strength and stability." Galison, Image and Logic (cit. n. 66), p. 781. See also Koch, "In the Image of Science?" (cit. n. 59), p. 892.
